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Abstract 
 
Microfinance institutions are important, particularly in developing countries, because 
they expand the frontier of financial intermediation by providing loans to those traditionally 
excluded from formal financial markets.  This paper presents the first systematic statistical 
examination of the performance of MFIs operating in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  A cost 
function is estimated for MFIs in the region from 1999-2004.  First, the presence of subsidies is 
found to be associated with higher MFI costs.  When output is measured as the number of loans 
made, we find that MFIs become more efficient over time and that MFIs involved in the 
provision of group loans and loans to women have lower costs.  However, when output is 
measured as volume of loans rather than their number, this last finding is reversed.  This may be 
due to the fact that such loans are smaller in size; thus for a given volume more loans must be 
made. 
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2 
Introduction 
 
Microfinance institutions are important, particularly in developing countries, because 
they expand the frontier of financial intermediation by providing loans to those traditionally 
excluded from the formal financial markets.  The contribution of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) to poverty alleviation has attracted significant attention in recent years.  For example, the 
United Nations declared 2005 to be the International Year of Microcredit.  Although usually 
small, MFIs control significant resources and serve significant numbers of borrowers.  For 
example, in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) alone, these organizations have an asset 
base of about $1 billion and serve about 500,000 active borrowers (Foster, Green, and 
Pytkowska, 2004).   
Despite the growing importance of MFIs there have been no studies of MFI performance 
in the ECA region.  While there has been a substantial prior literature on the cost structure of 
European banks (see, for example, Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux, and Moore 2001; Altunbas 
and Molyneaux, 1996; Pastor, 2002; and Pastor, Perez, and Quesada, 1997) there have been only 
a few recent systematic studies of bank performance in the ECA region (Fries and Tasci, 2005; 
Hasan and Marton, 2003; and Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005a, 2005b).  
There is no systematic empirical work to date on the performance of MFIs, but there have 
been a few empirical studies in the related areas of relationship lending and community banking 
(see, for example, Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger, Hasan, and Klapper 2004; Berger, Klapper, 
Miller, and Udell, 2003; and Berger and Udell, 2002). 
This paper adds to the literature by presenting the first systematic statistical examination 
of the performance of MFIs operating in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  Using high-quality 
data for a sample of MFIs from the region from 1999 to 2004, we estimate a cost function, 
incorporating characteristics which the literature suggests are likely to influence productivity but 
whose impact on MFIs in the ECA region has not been empirically estimated.  For example, 
theoretical work suggests that group lending methodology decreases the costs of serving 
marginal clientele by mitigating problems of adverse selection (Ghatak 1999; Armendariz de 
Aghion and Collier, 2000) and moral hazard (Stiglitz, 1990; Laffont and Rey, 2003; Rai and 
Sjostrom, 2004).  The empirical evidence for non-ECA MFIs shows that group lending is 
associated with higher repayment rates (Gomez and Santor, 2003).  Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch (2000) argue, however, that individual lending contracts with dynamic incentives may  
3 
be more cost-effective in countries in the ECA region.  One goal of this paper is to provide 
empirical evidence on the issue of the relative costs of group lending. 
To fulfill their poverty alleviation mission MFIs often target women because the majority 
of the poor are female.  Because women have less access to capital, the return to capital may be, 
on average, higher than for men.  Therefore, if capital is not fully fungible within the family, 
endowing women with capital may be growth-enhancing.  Moreover, the limited labor mobility 
of women can decrease monitoring costs and reduce the incidence of strategic default.  To date, 
empirical studies have not focused on the cost consequences of targeted lending to women in 
ECA region; this paper provides the first evidence of the impact of this practice on the cost 
structure of MFIs. 
Another unique aspect of MFI operations is the presence of subsidies.  Although the 
ultimate goal of microfinance institutions is to become financially self-sustainable, in practice all 
receive direct and indirect subsidies.  The empirical impact of these subsidies on efficiency is not 
well understood (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005).  We present empirical evidence 
on how subsidies affect MFI productivity.  
To examine and measure these various effects, we estimate three cost functions, each 
using different measures of output.  Our first formulation uses the number of loans as an output 
measure, which is most consistent with the objective functions of these institutions.  The second 
formulation uses volume of loans as an output measure.  Our third formulation combines both 
the number and volume of loans as outputs.  Our most consistent finding across specifications is 
that the presence of subsidies is associated with higher MFI costs.  This result is consistent 
across all three output specifications and across several measures of subsidy.  Our other findings 
depend on the particular output measure used.  When output is measured as the number of loans, 
we find that MFIs become more efficient over time.  With output measured as the number of 
loans we also find that MFIs involved in the provision of group loans and loans to women have 
lower costs.  However, when output is measured as the total volume of loans, this last finding is 
reversed; MFIs involved in the provision of group loans and loans to women have higher than 
average costs.  This may be due to the fact that group loans and loans to women are typically 
small, so that for a given volume of loans, a greater percentage of loans of these types would 
indicate more transactions and thus higher costs.  
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Microfinance Institutions 
Microfinance has been defined as “a collection of banking practices built around 
providing small loans (typically without collateral) and accepting tiny savings deposits” 
(Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p.1).  Microfinance institutions provide financial 
services to the entrepreneurial poor who generally do not have access to traditional banking 
services.  MFIs pursue a double bottom line of outreach and sustainability.  On the one hand, 
MFIs fulfill an outreach mission by providing financial services to the poor.  On the other hand, 
MFIs must operate like other financial institutions, lending to creditworthy clients and earning 
positive returns on their loan portfolios in order to sustain and expand their operations 
(sustainability).  Because sustainability is an important goal of these organizations, we assume 
that MFIs strive to minimize costs of operation for any given level of operations. 
Since poor customers generally have no credit history and little collateral, MFIs must use 
innovative lending practices to reduce risks associated with asymmetric information between 
lender and borrower.  In fact, several studies have focused on understanding the mechanisms of 
lending practices such as group loans, a type of joint-liability loan, whereby the MFI delegates 
screening, monitoring, and contract enforcement costs to a group, and individual uncollateralized 
loans, whereby repayment is “secured” with a promise of access to larger loans in the future 
conditional on current loan repayment (Conning, 1999; Navajas et al., 2000).  Other studies have 
focused on the impact that MFIs have on borrowers (Brau and Woller, 2004). 
One way in which MFIs differ greatly from other financial institutions is that many 
aspects of MFI operations are characterized by subsidies.  For example, the MFI equity base 
used to begin operations is typically contributed by an international donor.  These donors include 
governments in developed countries, international organizations such as the World Bank, or 
intermediaries and international networks such as Opportunity International and FINCA 
International.  If additional funds are required, donors may offer outright grants or loans at either 
subsidized or commercial rates, with the recent trend toward providing loans rather than grants.   
In addition, MFIs may receive a variety of in-kind transfers and subsidies in the form of 
technical assistance and/or free physical capital.  These subsidies affect the prices of labor and 
capital.  In-kind subsidies can come in the form of outside funds for salaries of senior 
management or outside funds for personnel training.  Subsidies of this kind are provided via 
technical assistance contracts paid for by either the Technical Assistance (TA) agency or a  
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donor.  In addition to these subsidies, local governments and TA agencies may provide cars, 
buildings, or other facilities to MFIs. 
 
Microfinance in the ECA Region 
At the beginning of the transition period, banks naturally focused on lending to larger and 
state-owned enterprises.  Soon there were severe banking crises in almost every transition 
country.  Two factors contributed to these crises.  One factor was lax bank licensing policies.  A 
second factor was the failure of banks to impose hard budget constraints because they correctly 
assumed that the government would bail them (Perotti, 1998).  The lingering consequence of 
these bank crises is the present overregulation of the sector which makes provision of financial 
services to the poor even more difficult  
MFIs emerged as one of the efforts to fill the gap in the financial services industry.  In 
early transition, there was considerable interest in providing credit to Small (<100 employees) 
and Medium (<500 employees) Enterprises (SMEs) but not to micro-entrepreneurs and self-
employed individuals.  For example, in the first report on the state of microcredit in the region, 
the OECD indicated that out of the 20 SME programs operating in Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary  only four reached microenterprises with small amounts of credit and three included 
microenterprises as part of their portfolio (Microcredit in Transitional Economies, OECD, 1996).  
The first microfinance initiatives date back to 1992.  Initially, large microfinance 
networks such as Opportunity International, CARE International, FINCA, and religious charities 
such as Catholic Relief sent missions to various countries to start microfinance activities.  Some 
of these initiatives later grew into independent institutions.  In addition, international donors such 
as the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and The 
German Development Agency (GTZ) provided grants and technical expertise resulting in the 
creation of new microfinance institutions.  
In the past decade international donors increasingly prefer loans to grants for the 
establishment of microfinance activity.  In fact, many of the loans to MFIs in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia are simply commercial bank loans at the market rate of interest.  As a consequence, 
the relatively young MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, relying more heavily on loans 
than grants, perhaps did not develop a subsidy-dependent culture.  MFIs in this region operated  
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in a unique environment unlike that of MFIs in other developing countries.  These differences are 
manifested in the customers served, the products offered, and the funding sources available.  
MFI Clients and Services.  Microfinance initiatives in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
emerged in an environment with considerable suspicion of and inexperience with 
entrepreneurship as well as lack of experience with charity and financial services.  The 
widespread mistrust of the entrepreneur gave rise to a tendency on the part of government to 
overregulate entrepreneurial activity rather than create an enabling environment.  For MFIs 
entering the market this meant that there were additional challenges because their clients faced 
not only financing constraints but also significant institutional constraints.  These disadvantages 
were partially offset by the higher educational and skill levels of displaced workers in the ECA 
region seeking to become entrepreneurs. 
MFIs in the region serve a wide range of clients but cater mostly to the poor and 
especially poor women.  Foster, Green, and Pytkowska (2003) report that at the one end of the 
spectrum of MFI clients are women displaced or widowed by wars who require smaller loans 
(less than $1,000) and for whom group loans may be appropriate.  At the other end of the MFI 
spectrum are loans of up to $2,500 offered to established microenterprises typically employing 
one or two people (such as mechanics, hairdressers and in some cases even doctors and dentists).  
On rare occasions the larger microenterprises take loans in the $5,000-$10,000 range.  
MFIs in the ECA region have adapted their traditional lending technologies and 
management practices to accommodate the challenges of the environment and to take advantage 
of the opportunities that countries in the ECA region offer (Hartarska, 2005). For example, even 
MFIs that exclusively provide group loans such as FINCA International, introduced innovative 
individual lending techniques more appropriate to the new type of clients (Armendariz de 
Aghion and Morduch, 2000).   
Compared to MFIs in other world regions, MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are 
among the youngest in the microfinance industry but already have showed financial results that 
are among the best in the industry (Benchmarking Microfinance in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, Microfinance Center, 2004).  For example, The Microbanking Bulletin No 9 shows that in 
2003 the average MFI in the ECA region was 5 years old, and had gross portfolio yield of 35 
percent (in real terms), and operational self-sustainability of 131 percent, while the average MFI  
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in the industry was 9 years old and had portfolio yield of 29 and operational self-sustainability of 
123 percent. 
Microfinance services in the ECA region are offered by four groups of organizations: 1) 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or financial companies exclusively devoted to 
microfinance; 2) microfinance banks, which are chartered commercial banks devoted to 
microfinance services; 3) commercial banks which offer some microloans usually through a 
separate unit within the bank dedicated to MFI activities (called downscaling); and 4) Credit 
Unions.   
Only ten credit unions are included in the analysis because most credit unions are not 
heavily involved in microfinance activities.  Commercial bank departments engaged in 
microfinance but not operating as independent organizations do not have comparable data and 
are also excluded from the analysis.   
As we state previously, much of what had been written about MFI productivity is without 
the benefit of empirical support.  This problem is a largely a consequence of the limited 
availability of MFI data.  Using high-quality MFI data, we specify and estimate several translog 
cost functions in order to empirically examine several hypotheses about MFI operations. 
  
The Model 
The translog (transcendental logarithmic) form is used for all the cost estimations.  While 
there are limitations to the translog form, it has a long history of use in this area; for example see 
Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Altunbas and Molyneaux (1996), and DeYoung and Hasan (1998). 
The translog functional form is 
∑ ∑∑ ∑
∑ ∑∑ ∑
+ +
+ + + =
, ln ln ln ln ) 2 / 1 (
ln ln ) 2 / 1 ( ln ln ln 0
k j jk k l lk
j i ij k k j j
p q p p
q q p q C
δ β
α β α α
 (1) 
where C is total cost, q’s are output levels, p’s are input prices, and the ∀’s, ∃’s, and ∗’s are 
parameters to be estimated.  Homogeneity in input prices requires Ε∃k = 1, Ε∃lk = Ε∃kl = 0 over 1 
and k, and Ε∗jk = 0 for any qj.  These restrictions are imposed in the estimation by normalizing 
(dividing) all input prices and total cost by the price of capital (PCAP).  Also, data are mean-
scaled (divided by their means) in order to facilitate calculation of scale economies.  In order to 
improve efficiency of the estimation, we also estimate the cost share equations  
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with cross equation parameter constraints imposed.  The translog cost function, along with the 
share equations, is estimated using the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method.      
 
Data 
   Lack of high quality data has been the major obstacle to studying MFI productivity.  The 
microfinance industry has become more transparent recently as a result of increased competition 
among MFIs for donations, subsidies, and loans because donors have become more selective of 
the projects they fund.  As a consequence, industry-wide data have become available only 
recently.  An important advantage of the data used here is that these are high-quality data.   
Simply using financial statements from various MFIs makes comparisons problematic because 
many MFIs are non-regulated and organizationally diverse.  Their financial statements might not 
include all subsidies and might not be inflation adjusted.  Auditing of financial statements is not 
required of all organizational types.  Moreover, differences in cross-country accounting 
standards complicate the comparison of financial statements across countries. 
To correct for such problems, the Micro Banking Bulletin (MBB) has developed 
standards that facilitate comparisons of MFI financial statements across countries. Individual 
MFIs from across the world submit their financial data which is checked and corrected by the 
MBB staff or a regional partner.  In the case of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, MFI data is 
checked and corrected by the Microfinance Center for Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly 
Independent States (Microfinance Center for CEE and NIS).  Staff members of the Microfinance 
Center CEE and NIS carefully examine each individual financial statement, performing 
numerous adjustments and checks, and, when necessary, engage in follow-up data collection to 
ensure that data across MFIs is comparable.  
The data used in the study have been provided by the Microfinance Center for CEE and 
NIS. The data set contains high quality financial information on MFIs operating in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia in for the years 1999 to 2004.  As Table 1 indicates, the largest numbers 
of observations in the sample come from Bosnia and Herzegovina (43), Russia (20), and Georgia 
(18).    
Our selection and specification of regression variables generally follows LeCompte and 
Smith (1990) and Caudill, Ford and Gropper (1995).   We explore both the “intermediation  
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approach” and the “production approach” to modeling costs.  In addition, we combine 
production and intermediation in to a third approach.   
All financial variables are denominated in $US and adjusted for country-specific 
inflation.  Loans are measured alternately as the number of loans and the dollar volume of loans, 
depending upon whether the intermediation or production approach is used.   Many of the input 
prices faced by MFIs in the sample are subsidized.  We use the subsidized input prices in our 
cost function because these are the input prices faced by the MFI managers.   
In this study we consider as many as two outputs—number of loans and volume of loans, 
and three inputs: labor, physical capital and financial capital.  In addition, other variables 
believed to be related to MFI costs are also explored.  A discussion of the construction of each of 
the variables used in this study follows.  
Labor.  The price of labor is calculated as actual personnel expense (unadjusted for in-
kind subsidies such as salary of senior manager paid in by TA or technical assistance money), 
divided by the number of employees.  
Physical Capital.  The price of physical capital is calculated as actual operating expense 
(unadjusted for in-kind subsidy such as free rent or TA paid fixed capital related expense) minus 
actual personnel expense divided by the net fixed assets (that is, fixed assets net of accumulated 
depreciation and adjusted for inflation to account for appreciation of the physical assets).   
Financial Capital.  The price of financial capital is actual expense on financial capital 
divided by the stock of financial capital.  Financial expense is calculated as the sum of interest 
and fees on borrowing, net of inflation adjustment expense (calculated as the difference between 
inflation adjustment expense due to inflation eroding the portfolio and inflation revenue resulting 
from the increased value of fixed assets) plus other financial expense, which includes exchange 
rate related expense.  We believe exchange rate expense should be included in financial capital 
because many MFIs obtain loans in hard currency (USD or Euro) but extend loans in local 
currency and thus face substantial exchange rate risk.  
Output.  Output is defined two ways in our estimations.  Our first measure (NLoans) is 
actually the number of borrowers.  Our data on MFIs contain number of borrowers but not 
number of loans.  Given the typical MFI clientele, it is unlikely that individuals have more than 
one loan so we do expect a close correspondence between the two.  An alternative measure of  
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output, VLoans, or the volume of loans is also used in this study.  VLoan is defined to be an 
MFI’s loan portfolio net of accumulated loan loss reserves. 
Total Cost.  Total cost is the sum of input quantities times input prices—the sum of 
financial expense, adjusted for inflation but not for subsidies, plus actual operating expense. 
Estimation of the statistical cost function provides a solid theoretical framework in which 
to evaluate a variety of factors related to MFI performance.  To do so we incorporate several 
exogenous variables directly into the cost function.  We include Age, Pwomen, Group, and 
several subsidy measures.  A brief discussion of each follows. 
Age.  We include the age of the institution.  We expect that learning occurs over the life 
of the MFI as managers gain experience in that institution and environment.  We expect older 
MFIs to be more efficient producers, such that costs are lower for a given quantity of output. 
Pwomen.  We include the percentage of loans made to women.  There are some findings 
that indicate that loans to women may be less expensive because women have better repayment 
rates (Khandker, Khalily, and Kahn, 1995; Hulme 1991, Gobbons and Kasim, 1991). These 
results come from MFIs in non ECA regions so the precise effect for MFIs in ECA remains an 
empirical question. 
Group.  We also examine the effect of the practice of making group loans by the MFI.  
We define this variable to be equal to one if the MFI made loans to either solidarity groups or 
village groups.  We do not have prior expectations about he sign of this variable because 
although evidence from non ECA regions suggests that group lending has lower costs, 
researchers have suggested that innovative individual lending may work as well and be even less 
costly in the ECA region (Gomez and Santor, 2003; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000).  
Indeed, MFIs in the region have come up with some innovative individual lending practices.  For 
example, in Albania tangible assets with negligible resale value but high private value are 
effectively used as collateral.  In Russia, a visit to the home is as important as look at the 
financial statements to ensure better screening.  In rural Albania, elements of peer screening are 
introduced in individual lending because villagers must obtain a loan guarantee and a character 
evaluation by a local village credit committee in order to get a loan.  
Subsidy.  Our constructed subsidy variable is the sum of two components.  The first 
component accounts for in-kind payments that subsidize costs of labor and physical capital, and 
is calculated as the difference between adjusted and unadjusted operating expense.  The second  
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component is the cost of subsidized financial capital calculated as the deposit rate times the 
average equity, which is the sum of beginning of the year and end of year equity (which includes 
current year direct subsidies) divided by two.  We expect that MFIs with subsidies and thus 
softer budget constraints will have higher costs.  
Sub/NLoan and Sub/VLoan. These are alternative constructed measures of subsidy.   
Sub/NLoan is the subsidy per loan and Sub/VLoan is the subsidy per dollar of loans.  For the 
reasons discussed previously, we expect these measures to be positively related to costs. 
Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI).  The subsidy dependence index is another measure of 
subsidy that is widely used in the development literature.  The SDI, developed by Yaron (1992), 
is calculated as subsidy divided by revenue from lending, where subsidy is the average cost of 
capital calculated as the deposit rate times the beginning-of-the-year equity (the sum of paid in 
capital, donated equity and retained earnings in years prior to the current year) plus the deposit 
rate times one-half of the additions to equity in the current year.  From this amount the value of 
net income after taxes but before donations is excluded because this is the revenue generated in 
the current year.  Net income unadjusted for inflation is used to construct the SDI.  This index is 
narrowly defined to answer the question by how much a lender must increase its revenues in 
order to cover its costs if the lender had no access to subsidized resources. 
The variable definitions, means, and standard deviations of all variables used in our 
analyses are given in Table 2.  Our original data set contained 171 observations, but some 
observations were deleted due to missing or unreliable values.  In particular, in the final analysis 
we include only MFIs with positive values of TC, NLoan, VLoan, PL, PK, and PCAP.  Ultimately, 
our regression results are based on a sample of 155 observations.  
 
Estimation Results 
Initially, we considered estimating a cost function with three outputs:  loans, short and 
long term financial assets, and deposits.  We elected not to pursue this specification because few 
of the ECA MFIs are involved, to a significant degree, in anything other than loans.  
Several models are estimated to uncover aspects of MFI operations.  These estimation 
results are contained in Tables 3, 4, and 5.  Table 3 presents the SUR estimation results using the 
number of loans (NLoan) as output.  Three models are estimated including different subsidy 
measures.  Column 2 of Table 3 presents the estimation results including our calculated subsidy  
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variable.  The model exhibits an excellent fit.  The system-weighted R
2 is 0.81 and thirteen of the 
fourteen regression coefficients are statistically significant at the α=.10 level or better.  The signs 
and magnitudes of the coefficients of NLoan, PL, and PK are all in accord with theory.  The 
coefficient of NLoan is the output elasticity.  The value of 0.67 is consistent with the average 
MFI operating under conditions of increasing returns to scale.  However, this result must be 
interpreted with caution because some MFIs do produce other outputs.   
Our main interest is in the signs and magnitudes of the added variables:  Age, Pwomen, 
Group, and Subsidy.  Coefficients of all four of these variables are statistically significant at the 
α=.10 level or better.  The coefficient of age indicates that costs rise over time as the MFI 
continues to operate.  This may occur due to rent-seeking behavior of MFI managers or, 
possibly, an increase in the size of the loans being offered.  This issue is examined later with the 
estimation of some additional specifications of output.  The coefficient of Pwomen indicates that 
costs fall as the percentage of loans made to women increases.  This finding is consistent with 
assertions in the development literature.  The coefficient of the Group variable indicates that 
those MFIs offering group loans have lower costs.  This finding is also consistent with assertions 
in the development literature.  The positive coefficient of subsidy indicates that larger subsidies 
are associated with higher costs.  This result is consistent with our expectations about 
inefficiencies created by the presence of subsidies. 
Column three of Table 3 presents the SUR estimation results from a similar cost model 
with the only change being that the Subsidy measure replaced by Sub/NLoan, or subsidy per 
loan.  The results are very similar to those discussed above for the model in column two.  The 
coefficient of the new variable, subsidy per loan, is positive and significant indicating, again, that 
subsidies are associated with increased costs. 
In our final estimation results using the production approach, the subsidy dependence 
index, SDI, is our measure of subsidy.  These SUR estimation results are included in column 
four of Table 3.  The system-weighted R
2 is 0.81 and eleven of the fourteen regression 
coefficients are statistically significant at the α=.10 level or better.  The output elasticity is 
estimated to be 0.75.   
The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of NLoans, PL, and PK are, again, all in 
accord with theory.  However, only two coefficients of the extra variables, Age and Pwomen, are 
significantly differently from zero.  The coefficient of age indicates, again, that costs rise with  
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age.  The coefficient of Pwomen is negative and significant indicating that making a higher 
percentage of loans to women reduces costs.  The measure of subsidy in this formulation, SDI, is 
not significantly different from zero. 
In order to more fully examine the effects of Age, Pwomen, Group, and Subsidy on MFI 
costs, we re-estimated the models using the intermediation approach where loans are measured 
not as the number of loans but as the volume of loans.  This approach is probably not as 
representative of MFI goals and operations as the production approach, but it is in line with 
many studies of financial institutions. We again use the SUR estimation method and estimate the 
model three times including different measures of subsidy. 
Column two of Table 4 presents the estimation results including our calculated subsidy 
variable.  The system-weighted R
2 is 0.86 which is somewhat higher than with the production 
model.  This is expected because the volume of loans is more consistent with the balance sheet 
approach to the calculation of the other variables in the cost function.  Eleven of the fourteen 
regression coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at the α=.10 level or 
better and the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of VLoans, PL, and PK are all in accord 
with theory.  The output elasticity is estimated to equal 0.76 which is, again, consistent with 
increasing returns to scale.  As before, this result is to be interpreted with caution due to the 
omitted outputs produced by some of the MFIs.   
Again, our main interest is in the signs and magnitudes of the added variables:  Age, 
Pwomen, Group, and Subsidy.  Coefficients of all four of these variables are statistically 
significant at the α=.10 level or better, however three signs have changed from our production 
version of the model.  Only the coefficient of subsidy is unchanged.  The negative coefficient on 
the age variable is consistent with learning over time and the coefficient of subsidy again 
indicates that subsidies are associated with inefficiency.  However, in this formulation of the cost 
function the coefficients of Group and Pwomen are positive and statistically significant.  The 
coefficient of Pwomen indicates that costs rise as the percentage of loans made to women 
increases and the coefficient of Group indicates that making group loans increases costs.   
Although these findings contradict our earlier results from the production model, they do make 
sense.  Output is now measured as dollar volume of loans.  As the loans to women and groups 
are typically small, for any volume of loans, a greater percentage of loans of this type is likely to 
increase costs.  
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In this formulation the coefficients of Age and Subsidy indicate a tradeoff.  The results 
indicate that one year of operating experience equals about $75,000 in subsidy or more when the 
loan volume is used as the output measure.    
Column three of Table 4 presents the SUR estimation results from a similar model with 
the only change being that the Subsidy variable is replaced by Sub/VLoan, or subsidy per dollar 
of loans.  The system-weighted R
2 is 0.86 and ten of the fourteen regression coefficients are 
statistically significant at the α=.10 level or better.  The output elasticity is estimated to equal 
0.83 and is consistent with increasing returns to scale, subject to the caveat discussed. 
The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of NLoans, PL, and PK are, again, all in 
accord with theory.  The results for the extra variables are also similar to our previous results.  
The main difference is that the coefficient of Age is no longer statistically significant but retains 
the negative sign.  The coefficients of Pwomen, Group, and Sub/VLoan are statistically 
significant at the α=.10 level or better.  As before the coefficients of Pwomen and Group are 
positive and significant.  The coefficient of the alternative subsidy variable, Sub/VLoan, is also 
positive and significant indicating that subsidies increase costs. 
Column four of Table 4 presents the SUR estimation results from the model with the 
subsidy dependence index, SDI, included.  The system-weighted R
2 is 0.86 and ten of the 
fourteen regression coefficients are statistically significant at the α=.10 level or better.  The 
output elasticity is estimated to equal 0.81 which again consistent with increasing returns to 
scale.   
The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of NLoans, PL, and PK are, again, all in 
accord with theory.  The results for the extra variables are also similar to our previous results.  
The coefficients of Age, Pwomen, Group, and Sub/VLoan are statistically significant at the 
α=.10 level or better.  As before the coefficients of Pwomen and Group are positive and 
significant.  The coefficient of the alternative subsidy variable, Sub/VLoan, is also positive and 
significant indicating that subsides increase costs.  Age is once again found to be negatively 
related to costs. 
As an alternative to the “production’ and “intermediation” models, we estimate a third set 
of regressions in which number of loans and volume of loans are included as output variables.  
Although this approach is seldom used in the literature on financial institutions, we feel it may 
help capture some of the characteristics of MFIs and provide better information on the effects of  
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Age, Pwomen, Group, and Subsidy variables on MFI operations.  We are able to perform 
hypothesis tests about the inclusion of both production and intermediation variables because both 
models are nested in the present version.  As we estimated models using four different subsidy 
variables, there are four different F-tests to report for each approach.  Testing the null hypothesis 
that the intermediation-based variables are all equal to zero leads to the following test statistics 
for the four models estimated in Table 5;  F4,447 =126.38, 124.93, 127.14, and 136.02.  The F-
statistics for the null hypothesis that all of the production-based variables equal zero are 43.06, 
47.25, 43.39, and 45.56, respectively.  In every case the null hypothesis is rejected at the α=.01 
level or better.  Thus, we do find statistical evidence for combining number of loans and volume 
of loans in the cost function. 
Column two of Table 5 presents the estimation results including our calculated subsidy 
variable and both NLoans and VLoans included as output variables.  The system-weighted R
2 is 
0.90.  Fifteen of the eighteen regression coefficients are statistically significant at the α=.10 level 
or better and the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of NLoans, VLoans, PL, and PK are all 
in accord with theory.  Again, our main interest is in the signs and magnitudes of the added 
variables:  Age, Pwomen, Group, and Subsidy.  Only the coefficients of Group and Subsidy are 
statistically significant at the α=.10 level or better.  The coefficient of Group indicates that MFIs 
making group loans have higher than average costs.  The coefficient of Age is negative which is 
consistent with learning over time, but not quite statistically significant (t = 1.58).  Once again, 
the coefficient of subsidy indicates that subsidies increase costs.  If our earlier calculation is 
repeated, with caution due to the low significance on Age, the result is that one year of 
experience is equal to about $70,000 of subsidy. 
Column three of Table 5 presents the estimation results including subsidy per loan.  The 
system-weighted R
2 is again in 0.90.  Fifteen of the eighteen regression coefficients are 
statistically significant at the α=.10 level or better and the signs and magnitudes of the 
coefficients of NLoans, VLoans, PL, and PK are all in accord with theory.  As before, coefficients 
of Group and the subsidy variable, Sub_NLoan, are statistically significant at the α=.10 level or 
better.  Age is once again negative and does not quite achieve statistical significance. 
Column four of Table 5 presents the estimation results including subsidy per loan dollar.  
The system-weighted R
2 is again 0.90.  Again, fifteen of the eighteen regression coefficients are 
statistically significant at the α=.10 level or better and the signs and magnitudes of the  
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coefficients of NLoans, VLoans, PL, and PK are all in accord with theory.  As before, coefficients 
of Group and the subsidy variable, Sub_VLoan are statistically significant at the α=.10 level or 
better.   
Column five of Table 5 presents the estimation results including the subsidy dependence 
index.  The system-weighted R
2 is again 0.90.  Again, fifteen of the eighteen regression 
coefficients are statistically significant at the α=.10 level or better and the signs and magnitudes 
of the coefficients of NLoans, VLoans, PL, and PK are all in accord with theory.  As before, 
coefficients of Group and the subsidy variable, SDI, are statistically significant at the α=.10 level 
or better.  Age is again negative but not statistically significant. 
When considering these results as a whole some facts about MFI operations appear clear.  
The first thing to note is that the mere presence of subsidies is associated with increased costs.  
That is clear from all output configurations and all measures of subsidy.  Second, we find 
evidence to support the notion that MFIs become more efficient over time when number of loans 
is the measure of output.  We also find that the cost of providing group loans and loans to women 
is lower and that MFIs heavily engaged in these activities have lower costs.   
 
Conclusions 
  Although there are literally hundreds of studies examining bank efficiency issues, our 
study is the first to examine similar issues in microfinance institutions.  We examine 
microfinance institutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia using 1999-2004 data.   
We estimate three models, each based on different measures of output.  Our first formulation 
uses the number of loans as an output measure and the second formulation uses volume of loans 
as an output measure.  Our final formulation includes both number and volume of loans as 
outputs.  Our most consistent finding is that the presence of subsides increases MFI costs.  This 
result is consistent across all three output specification and across several measures of subsidy.  
Our other findings vary depending on the particular output measure used.  When output is 
measured as the number of loans, we find that MFIs become more efficient over time.  In this 
formulation of the cost function we also find those MFIs involved in the provision of group loans 
and loans to women have lower costs.  When output is measured as volume of loans, this last 
finding is reversed. Those MFIs involved in the provision of group loans and loans to women 
have higher than average costs.    
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The need to achieve an outreach mission distinguishes microfinance institutions from 
other financial intermediaries.  MFIs that attempt to reach as many clients as possible are able to 
do that at lower costs by offering loans to women and using group lending.  Banks and other 
traditional financial firms, therefore, may not be able to compete well with MFIs in achieving 
such objectives.  However, if the goal is to provide access to substantial amount of capital to the 
entrepreneurial poor, that is, provide access to larger loans in a cost-effective manner, more 
traditional lending methodologies may be better suited.   
MFIs have a role to play in extending credit to those who have traditionally been 
excluded from formal financial markets.  The efficiency with which they perform that role is 
important in the short term, as they attempt to reach the greatest number of clients, and for the 
long term growth and development of the formal financial markets and economies in these 
regions.  While MFIs have typically been established with subsidies, some of the evidence found 
here suggests that they can become more cost efficient over time, and survive without subsidies.  
Whether MFIs assume a more important role in the longer term financial structure in the ECA 
region as these countries develop is an interesting and important question.  
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TABLE 1 
Geographic Distribution of Sample of Microfinance Institutions 
Country  Number of Observations 
Albania 9 
Armenia 9 
Azerbaijan 7 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  43 
Bulgaria 6 
Croatia (Hrvatska)  7 
Georgia 18 
Kazakhstan 4 
Kosovo 6 
Kyrgyzstan 8 
Macedonia 1 
Moldova 1 
Mongolia 6 
Montenegro 3 
Poland 1 
Romania 10 
Russia 20 
Tajikistan 3 
Ukraine 3 
Uzbekistan 2 
Yugoslavia 4 
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TABLE 2 
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Means 
(Standard deviations) 
TC ($US) 
(Total  Cost) 
1,122,827 
(1000645) 
NLoan 
(The number of loans) 
5469.7 
(5971) 
VLoan ($US) 
(The volume of loans) 
4,882,301 
(5821804) 
PL  8792.04 
(5347.11) 
PK  4.724 
(9.84) 
PCAP  0.071 
(0.09) 
Pwomen 
(Proportion of loans made to women) 
0.605 
(0.26) 
Group 
(Dummy variable indicating that the MFI 
makes loans made to either groups or 
villages) 
0.077 
(0.27) 
Subsidy 
(The subsidies given to the MFI in 1000s 
of dollars) 
178.32 
(201.87) 
SDI 
(Subsidy dependence index)  
-0.008 
(0.483)  
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TABLE 3 
SUR Estimation Results-Production Approach 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Intercept  -0.462 
(3.40) 
-0.354 
(2.91) 
-0.261 
(2.05) 
NLoan  0.666 
(13.4) 
0.781 
(17.56) 
0.750 
(16.04) 
PL  0.437 
(49.84) 
0.438 
(49.89) 
0.436 
(49.59) 
PK  0.326 
(37.12) 
0.325 
(37.09) 
0.329 
(37.38) 
NLoan*NLoan  0.114 
(3.94) 
0.112 
(4.01) 
0.141 
(4.35) 
PL* PL  0.071 
(13.24) 
0.073 
(13.68) 
0.073 
(14.02) 
PK* PK  0.060 
(11.96) 
0.061 
(12.04) 
0.062 
(12.65) 
PL* PK  -0.026 
(-6.68) 
-0.027 
(6.91) 
-0.028 
(7.40) 
PL* NLoan  0.021 
(3.93) 
0.021 
(4.03) 
0.021 
(3.97) 
PK* NLoan  -0.006 
(1.10) 
-0.006 
(1.03) 
-0.006 
(1.05) 
Age  0.028 
(1.77) 
0.026 
(1.72) 
0.035 
(2.18) 
Pwomen  -0.458 
(3.49) 
-0.122 
(4.06) 
-0.597 
(4.74) 
Group  -0.229 
(1.93) 
-0.209 
(1.81) 
-0.197 
(1.62) 
Subsidy  0.001 
(3.80) 
----- ----- 
Sub/Nloan  ----- 0.002 
(5.51) 
----- 
SDI  ----- ----- 0.023 
(0.31)  
System-weighted 
R
2 
0.81 0.82 0.81 
*Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t-ratios.  
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TABLE 4 
SUR Estimation Results-Intermediation Approach 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Intercept  0.144 
(1.25) 
0.218 
(2.10) 
0.299 
(2.93) 
VLoan  0.758 
(14.09) 
0.826 
(17.01) 
0.811 
(16.99) 
PL  0.379 
(23.38) 
0.377 
(28.20) 
0.378 
(28.47) 
PK  0.314 
(25.16) 
0.315 
(25.21) 
0.315 
(25.33) 
VLoan*VLoan  -0.001 
(0.05) 
0.010 
(0.44) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
PL* PL  0.068 
(10.50) 
0.068 
(10.37) 
0.070 
(10.87) 
PK* PK  0.048 
(9.37) 
0.047 
(9.14) 
0.048 
(9.35) 
PL* PK  0.007 
(1.67) 
0.007 
(1.55) 
0.008 
(1.74) 
PL* VLoan  -0.028 
(4.19) 
-0.029 
(4.25) 
-0.029 
(-4.29) 
PK* VLoan  -0.004 
(0.59) 
-0.003 
(0.41) 
-0.003 
(-0.54) 
Age  -0.024 
(1.92) 
-0.020 
(1.60) 
-0.024 
(1.96) 
Pwomen  0.321 
(3.38) 
0.305 
(3.16) 
0.285 
(3.03) 
Group  0.171 
(1.85) 
0.169 
(1.78) 
0.193 
(2.09) 
Subsidy  0.000 
(2.25) 
----- ----- 
Sub/Vloan  ----- 1.148 
(2.29) 
----- 
SDI  ----- ----- 0.087 
(1.66) 
System-weighted 
R
2 
0.86 0.86 0.86 
*Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t-ratios.  
22 
TABLE 5 
SUR Estimation Results-Combined Approach 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Intercept  0.179 
(1.83) 
0.223 
(2.61) 
0.234 
(2.67) 
0.305 
(3.53) 
VLoan  0.569 
(11.07) 
0.585 
(12.08) 
0.620 
(12.31) 
0.596 
(12.19) 
NLoan  0.319 
(8.84) 
0.356 
(9.93) 
0.317 
(8.69) 
0.327 
(9.23) 
PL  0.339 
(29.13) 
0.338 
(29.08) 
0.338 
(28.98) 
0.340 
(29.15) 
PK  0.336 
(26.37) 
0.336 
(26.46) 
0.337 
(26.47) 
0.336 
(26.39) 
VLoan*VLoan  -0.027 
(1.29) 
-0.016 
(0.82) 
-0.120 
(0.98) 
-0.027 
(1.33) 
NLoan*NLoan  0.101 
(5.03) 
0.097 
(4.84) 
0.103 
(5.06) 
0.092 
(4.38) 
PL* PL  0.091 
(15.57) 
0.091 
(15.64) 
0.091 
(15.64) 
0.091 
(15.54) 
PK* PK  0.066 
(13.56) 
0.067 
(13.81) 
0.065 
(13.38) 
0.065 
(13.29) 
PL* PK  -0.017 
(4.30) 
-0.017 
(4.39) 
-0.018 
(4.43) 
-0.017 
(4.26) 
PL*NLoan  0.064 
(11.21) 
0.064 
(11.25) 
0.065 
(11.31) 
0.064 
(11.17) 
Pk*NLoan  -0.023 
(3.49) 
-0.023 
(3.51) 
-0.024 
(3.55) 
-0.024 
(3.52) 
PL* VLoan  -0.082 
(10.96) 
-0.082 
(11.03) 
-0.083 
(11.09) 
-0.081 
(10.87) 
PK* VLoan  0.024 
(3.02) 
0.025 
(3.11) 
0.026 
(3.20) 
0.025 
(3.11) 
Age  -0.016 
(1.52) 
-0.016 
(1.58) 
-0.013 
(1.25) 
-0.015 
(1.46) 
Pwomen  0.034 
(0.38) 
0.020 
(0.23) 
0.015 
(0.16) 
-0.007 
(0.08) 
Group  0.219 
(2.73) 
0.211 
(2.66) 
0.215 
(2.65) 
0.220 
(2.74) 
Subsidy  0.000 
(1.89) 
----- ----- ----- 
Sub/Vloan  ----- 0.001 
(2.71) 
----- ----- 
Sub/Nloan  ----- ----- 0.941 
(2.23) 
----- 
SDI  ----- ----- ----- 0.121 
(2.63) 
R
2  0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90  
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